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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONSPIRACY-CIVIL LIABILITY-WHETHER

TRADE UNION

MEM-

BERS ARE LIABLE FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM CONSPIRACY.-

In the recent case of United Electric Coal Companies v. Rice,1
the employees of the mine were members of the United Mine
Workers of America. The Progressive Miners of America came
into existence after appellant's contract with the United union
had expired. The progressives sought to oust the United union

and called their members from appellant's employment. When
the appellant, employing members who refused to strike, sought
to open the mine, picketing and acts of violence occurred. The
appellant, being forced to suspend operations, filed suit against
a large number of individual members and several local unions
of District No. 1 of the Progressive Miners of America and
against said District No. 1 to enjoin said defendants from in1

22 F. Supp. 221 (1938).
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terfering with the operation of appellant's mine and for general
relief. The District Court2 held for defendants on the grounds
that the court was without jurisdiction to grant such relief in
view of the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,3 but on
appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals4 reversed the decision, enjoined the defendant, and ordered that the court retain jurisdiction of the cause for any other relief to which the plaintiff might
be entitled. The plaintiff then filed its original motion based on
the record for an assessment and allowance of damages. The
District Court then fixed the damages at $117,000. In support
of this award it was held that no one questioned the right of labor
to strike or to quit work at any time. Although the employer
might have to quit business and suffer heavy losses by reason of
such strike the striking employees are not liable for the resulting
damages, for they are merely doing what they have a right to
do. When, however, such strikers enter into a conspiracy to inflict violent injury upon the employer or his property and actually do injury, then such unions and officers thereof are liable
to respond in damages for such injury. But in determining the
amount of recovery the court made a distinction between the
damages which were not recoverable since they grew out of the
strike itself and those which grew out of the unlawful conspiracy,
which were recoverable.0
While the rule seems to be that "a combination to injure a
person's business by preventing other persons, by threats and
intimidations, from entering his employment is an unlawful conUnited Electric Coal Companies v. Rice, 9 F. Supp. 635 (1934).
8 U. S. C. A., Tit. 29, § 106, which provides that "no officer or member of
any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any
court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual
authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual
knowledge thereof."
4 United Electric Coal Companies v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (1935).
5 The manner in which the amount of the award was reached is as follows:
Although the strike commenced April 1, 1933, the court held that the unlawful
conspiracy did not commence until Sept. 7, 1934. The conspiracy ended on
January 20, 1936. After the mine was reopened, it made a profit of $46,863.62
for the remaining ten and a half months it operated in 1936. These profits,
rather than the profits realized by the mine prior to the strike, were used as
a basis on which the damages should be assessed.
Loss of profits (Sept. 7, 1934 to Jan. 20, 1936) .........................
$70,000
Amount of overhead allocated to this mine during that period- 22,000
25,000
Heavy shutdown expense incurred by reason of strike ..............
2

Total $117,000
Plaintiff also asked for exemplary damages and for interest, but these
were denied.
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spiracy and actionable when injury results,"6 yet the instances
where the courts have permitted the recovery of damages against
labor unions have been relatively few. This is largely due to
the rule that unincorporated unions are not legal entities and
therefore cannot be sued in the association name. 7 Suit, however, can be brought against the individual members. 8 By statute,
in some states, trade unions may be sued in the association name. 9
An exception to the above rule that an unincorporated union
cannot be sued was established by the celebrated English case
of Taff Vale Railway Company v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants. Here the defendant's argument was that the only
entities capable of suing or being sued under the common law
of England were corporations and individuals and that the
union, being neither, could not be sued. The lower court overruled this contention and held that the legislature can give.
an association of individuals the capacity to own property and
to act by agents. It was also stated that there is necessarily a
correlative liability to the extent of the property for the acts
of the agents in such a situation. The court further held that
such a capacity to own property had been given by the acts of
1871 and 1876. The Court of Appeal10 reversed this decision
only to have its decision reversed, in turn, by the House of
Lords." The case was remitted to the King's Bench,'1 2 where it
was held that the union was in the nature of a quasi-corporation
and was liable for the acts of its agents as though it were a corporation. The case was settled for £23,000. The aftermath of
this case was the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, which declared
that "an action against a trade union . . . in respect of any
tortious act alleged to have been committed by or in behalf of
6 12 C. J. 599, § 143. See Allis Chalmers Co. v. Reliable Lodge, 111 F.
264 (1901) ; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888).
7 63 C. J. 703, § 91. See Baskins v. United Mine Workers of America,
150 Ark. 398, 234 S. W. 464 (1921); Cahill v. Plumbers, Gas & Steam
Fitters & Helpers' Local 93, 238 Ill. App. 123 (1925) ; Karges Furniture Co.
v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union No. 131, 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E.
877, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 788 (1905).
8 63 C. J. 704, § 91. See Sutton v. Workmeister, 164 Ill. App. 105 (1911)
Alden Bros. Co. v. Dunn, 264 Mass. 335, 162 N. E. 773 (1928).
9 Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green,
210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923) ; Bricklayers', Masons', and Plasterers' International Union of America v. Seymour Ruff and Sons, Inc., 160 Md. 483, 154
A. 52 (1931); Michaels v. Hillman, 183 N. Y. S. 195 (1920); Falciglia v.
Gallagher, 299 N. Y. S. 890 (1937); Jones v. Maher, 116 N. Y. S. 180
(1909).
10 119011 A. C. 426.
11 1 B. R. C. 832 (H. L., 1901).
12 [1901] 1 Y. B. 170, C. A. See Lord Reading and His Cases (New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1934), pp. 111-115.
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the trade union, shall not be entertained by any court ..... But
this act does not extend to persons i-citing or taking part in an
illegal strike." s The provision also states that it does not "preelude an action against a member or official individually for a
tort committed by him on behalf of himself and all other members of the union. "14

With the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law in the
United States in 1890, a new factor was introduced into
this apparent status of immunity of unions for their torts.
Section seven of that act provided that "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by any other
person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or
declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any
circuit court of the United States . . . and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained. . .. "" While it was

clearly the intent of Congress that this act should apply only to
unfair business practices in order to eliminate the evils of trusts
and monopolies, it was used in 189416 as a basis upon which to
secure an injunction against strikers. In the first seven years
after the passage of the act, the lower courts had held in only one
ease that a business combination had violated the Anti-Trust law.
"On the other hand they had, during the same period, declared
certain activities of labor unions to be violations of the act on
twelve different occasions."1 7 To check this unforeseen turn of
events, Congress, in 1914, passed the Clayton Act, Section 6 of
which recognized the right of labor unions to organize and to
strike 8 and Section 20 of which provided that no injunctions
were to be issued by the federal courts in labor disputes unless
necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property or property
rights. 9
The first case in which a union was held liable for damages
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law was the case of Lawlor v.
Loewe,2 ° where the plaintiff brought suit against the officers and
13 Edwin Stacey Oakes, The Law of Organized Labor and Industrial
Conflicts (lst ed., Rochester, N. Y.: The Lawyers Co-op. Publ. Co.), p. 155,

1141.

1 35.
15 Now covered by U. S. C. A., Tit. 15, § 15, in which the words "circuit
court" have been changed to read "district court."
16 United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans,
54 F. 994 (1893).
17 Edward Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1st ed., New York:
Harper & Bros.), p. 3.
18 U. S. C. A., Tit. 15, § 17.
19 U. S. C. A., Tit. 29, § 52.
20 209 F. 721 (1913), aff'd in 235 U. S. 522, 35 S. Ct. 170, 59 L. Ed. 341
(1915).
14 Ibid., p. 39,
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members of the union and charged a conspiracy in restraint of
trade in consequence of which the plaintiff suffered financial
losses of some $80,000. Basing its decision on the treble damage
clause, the lower court rendered an award of $252,130 in favor
of the plaintiffs and held that labor combinations for the purpose
of restraining or obstructing commerce are as much within the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law as similar combinations of capital.
Possibly the best known of the cases coming under the Sherman
Act was the Coronado case. 21 This was a suit for damages
against the United Mine Workers of America, the Arkansas
union, and others. After the case had been in the courts for
seven years, a judgment of $27,500 was rendered against the
Arkansas union. The second time this case came before the
United States Supreme Court 22 that learned body affirmed the
rule of the Taff Vale case and said, "We think that such
organizations [unincorporated trade-unions] are suable in the
Federal Courts for their acts, and that funds accumulated to
be expended in conducting strikes are subject to execution in
suits for torts committed by such unions in strikes." The third
time23 the case came before the Supreme Court, it was held that
the evidence showed that the actions of the union were in direct
violation of the Anti-Trust Act. The influence of that decision,
however, has been largely confined to the federal courts. There
has been but one state court 24 to follow this case, and the
25
Appellate Court of Illinois has definitely refused to follow it.

Thus, by and large, trade unions seem to be virtually immune
to actions for damages brought against them. According to one
writer, 26 there have been only five successful suits, with the
exception of the instant case, brought against them since 1922.27

21 The complete record of this case is: Dowd v. United Mine Workers of
America, 235 F. 1 (1916), certiorari denied, 242 U. S. 635, 37 S. Ct. 246,
61 L. Ed. 547 (1917) ; United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal
Co., 258 F. 829 (1919) ; United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal
Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975 (1922) ; Finley v. United
Mine Workers of America, 300 F. 972 (1924); United Mine Workers of
America v. Coronado Coal Co., 268 U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551, 69 L. Ed. 963
(1925).
22 In 1922. See note 21.
23 In 1925. See note 21.
24 Varnado v. Whitney, 166 Miss. 663, 147 So. 479 (1933).
25 Cahill v. Plumbers, etc., Local 93, 238 Ill. App. 123 (1925).
26 Francis W. Laurent, "Responsibility in Tort of Voluntary Unincorporated Associations," 12 Wis. L. Rev. 523.
27 United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 258 F. 829
(1919); Dextone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 60 F. (2d) 47 (1932);
Local Union No. 65 of Amalgamated S. M. W. I. A. v. Nalty, 7 F. (2d) 100
(1925) ; Grand International B. of L. Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98
So. 569 (1923) ; Bricklayers' International Union of America v. Ruff and
Sons, Inc., 160 Md. 483, 154 A. 52 (1931).
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Of these, two were brought under the Sherman Act, 28 and two
29
were permitted by reason of a state statute allowing such suit.

The instant case has been settled out of court and the order
granting the judgment has been vacated.80 As suit was not
brought under the Sherman Act, it is interesting to conjecture
what the Circuit Court of Appeals would have held if this case
had been taken to them for review.
G. KLOEK
CRIMINAL LAw-DoUBLE JEOPARDY-APPLICATION OF RuLE IN
CASES WHFERE ONE ACT RESULTS IN Two OR MORE OFFENSES.-

In the recent case of People v. Allen,' the facts showed that the
defendant, with the signal lights against him, drove at an excessive rate of speed across a street intersection and struck three
men, two of whom died of their injuries. Allen was indicted
for the death of one of the victims. The indictment was later
stricken on motion of the state's attorney, with leave to reinstate.
Defendant then made the statutory request, in writing, demanding trial within four months. Some nine months later, he was
discharged by the court for want of prosecution. He was later
indicted for the death of the other deceased victim, and he
28 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 258 F. 829 (1919);
Dextone Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 60 F. (2d) 47 (1932).
29 Grand International B. of L. Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So.
569 (1923) ; Bricklayers' International Union of America v. Ruff and Sons,
Inc., 160 Md.483, 154 A. 52 (1931).
30 Chicago Daily News, City Edition, March 19, 1938, p. 4, col. 8; Grand
International B. of L. Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923) ;
Bricklayers' International Union of America v. Ruff and Sons, Inc., 160 Md.
483, 154 A. 52 (1931). In the case of In Re Opinion of the Justices, 211
Mass. 618, 98 N. E. 337 (1912), the Supreme Court of Massachusetts was
called upon to pass on a proposed act which would have contemplated that
no action could be taken by any court against a trade union or an association
of employees or against any members or officials thereof in respect to a
tortious act alleged to have been committed by or in behalf of a trade union
or an association of employers. The court showed its attitude toward the
practice of exempting labor unions from liability for damages resulting from
their torts by saying, "It gives to certain favored ones, selected arbitrarily,
immunity from that equal liability for civil wrongs which is a sign of equality
between citizens and residents. It undertakes to clothe combinations of
employers and laborers with special power denied to other employers and
laborers and other members of society. In another aspect, it deprives all
individuals and associations, other than those named, of the protection to
safety, liberty and property which any free government must secure to its
subjects. It takes from them the unhampered right to assert in the courts
claims against all who tortiously assail their person and property and to
recover judgment for the injuries done. It would prevent all persons from
having recourse to law for vindication of rights or reparation for wrongs
against the privileged few therein designated."
1 368 Il1. 368, 14 N. E. (2d) 397 (1938).
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filed a petition for discharge setting up the former proceedings
as double jeopardy. The lower court overruled the petition, and
defendant was convicted. He prosecuted a writ of error to the
Supreme Court, where the judgment was affirmed.
This case is of especial interest in that it is the first time that
the Illinois Supreme Court has been called upon to decide
whether a party simultaneously striking several persons with a
car can be separately tried for the death of each without violation
of Article 2, paragraph 10, of the Illinois Constitution, which
provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
2
same offense. The court relied on the case of People v. Fox,
where it was held that an acquittal of a former charge of arson
was no bar to a prosecution for simultaneously burning the contents of the building to defraud an insurance company. The
court also cited the case of People v. Andrae,s where a night
watchman of a building was killed during the commission of a
burglary and it was held that the acquittal of the defendant on
a charge of murder was not a bar to a subsequent prosecution
for burglary. In the instant case, the court pointed out that
there is a distinction between an offense and the unlawful act
out of which it arises. The act, the court states, is the cause of
the offense which, conversely, is the result of the act. The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy relates to the same
"offense" and not, necessarily, to the same act.
On this question there is an array of authority on both sides.
On almost identical sets of fact, the court of Minnesota, in
State v. Fredlund,4 and the court of Oklahoma, in Fay v. State,5
both decided that where two or more persons are injured in a
single act, there are as many separate and distinct offenses as
there are persons injured by the unlawful act. In the case of
People v. Majors,' the California court held that the murder of
two persons by the same act constitutes two offenses for each
of which a separate prosecution will lie and that a conviction or
acquittal in one case does not bar a prosecution in the other. In
the Washington case of State v. Taylor,7 the court held that the
negligent driver could be separately tried for each of the five
deaths which resulted, and, under a somewhat similar set of
facts, the Vermont court in State V. O'Briens stated, "It is not a
2 269 Ill. 300, 110 N. E. 26 (1915).

3 305 Ill. 530, 137 N. E. 496 (1922).

4 200 Minn. 44, 273 N. W. 353, 113 A. L. R. 215 (1937).

5 71 P. (2d) 768 (Okla., 1937).
6 65 Cal. 138, 3 P. 597 (1884).
7 185 Wash. 198, 52 P. (2d) 1252 (1936).
8 106 Vt. 97, 170 A. 98 (1934).
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second jeopardy for the same act but a second jeopardy for the
same offense that is prohibited."
On the other hand, in cases where a motorist struck several
people at the same time, we find the New Jersey court, in State v.
Cosgrove,9 the Iowa court, in State v. Wheelock,' ° and the Tennessee court, in Smith v. State," all holding that an act of
negligence which results in the involuntary killing of two or
more human beings is ordinarily a single offense and is subject to
2
one and only one prosecution. In the case of People v. Barr,
where the defendant negligently failed to install a system of automatic sprinklers and wrongfully caused the death of ten persons,
the New York court held that there was but one offense.' 8
One authority on criminal law states that "to give our constitutional provision the force evidently meant, and to render it
effectual, 'same offense' must be interpreted as equivalent to the
same criminal act.' 1 4 Such appears to be the proposition contained in the Illinois case of People v. Vitale.,' 5 where, after
defendant was convicted for the murder of one person resulting
from the felonious burning of a dwelling which caused the
death of ten persons, he was held to trial on another indictment
for the murder of another of the victims so burned to death.
Defendant then filed a plea of autrefois convict and based the
same upon the proposition that the ten homicides resulting from
the same felonious burning of the dwelling constituted but one
offense. The Criminal Court of Cook County overruled the
state's demurrer to the plea, but no appellate review was granted
the state uecause of juridi i--i-..1 reasons. 1..strong ISSen- in
the instant case condemns the rule, therein announced, by stating,
"It must be borne in mind that under the rule announced in this
case a citizen may be tried an indefinite number of times for the
same criminal act until a jury is finally found which will render
a verdict suitable to the prosecution."
Another authority 16 has endeavored to rationalize these apparent inconsistencies by stating, "the cases on the present subject
9 103 N. J. L.412, 135 A. 871 (1927).
10 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N. W. 617 (1933).
11 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S. W. (2d) 400 (1929).
12 259 N. Y. 104, 181 N. E. 64 (1932).
13 12 Corn. L. Quart. 212.
14 J. P. Bishop, Commentaries on Criminal Law (8th ed., Chicago: T. H.
Flood & Co., 1892), I,635.
15 364 Ill. 589, 5 N. E. (2d) 474 (1936). No opinion was expressed in the
upper court as to the validity of the plea of autrefois convict, nor is it possible to say exactly on what theory the lower court overruled the demurrer
of the state.
16 113 A.L.R. 222.
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are in conflict, although when the facts of the particular cases are
taken into account, part of this apparent conflict disappears.
Where two persons are assaulted or killed 'at the same time,' the
result may be attributable to a single wrongful act, as, for
example, a single .shot or blow; or it may be due to two or more
wrongful acts, as several shots or blows. Under the latter circumstances, even though the several shots or blows are very
closely connected in point of time, if they are directed at different
persons and result in the injury or death of such persons, there is
apparently no question but that the offenses are distinct and an
acquittal or conviction of the inurder of or assault upon one person is not a bar to a prosecution for the murder or assault upon
another." Upon a consideration of the cases, however, there
appear to be but two states, Pennsylvania 17 and Texas,' 8 which
make this distinction.
It would seem, therefore, that the question becomes: Does the
constitutional provision as to double jeopardy speak in terms of
law broken or in terms of victims? If it is the former, we can
readily see how, in a case like the instant one, if the defendant
is once acquitted, he should not be again tried for the same
infringement of the one law. This view explains those situations
where a person, by one act, violates a municipal, state, and
federal regulation at the same titae. An acquittal or conviction
by the state would not prevent a later trial by the federal or
municipal authorities inasmuch as several laws are involved.' 9
17 Commonwealth v. Ernesto, 93 Pa. Super. 339 (1929).
Defendant's
negligence in constructing a dam caused it to break and drown three women.
The court held that there was but one legal effect, although the result in fact
injured many parties. (Case of single wrongful act.) Commonwealth v.
Weeks, 10 Pa. D. & C. 568 (1927). In this case defendant shot mother and
son in bed. The court held that conviction of the murder of the mother was
no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the murder of the boy. (Case of
several wrongful acts.) Commonwealth v. Melissari, 298 Pa. 63, 148 A. 45
(1929). Here accused pursued a car in which his victims were riding, forced
it to the curb, and poured a fusillade of shots into the car, killing the occupants. The court held that conviction of the murder of one of the victims was
no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the murder of one of the others.
(Case of several wrongful acts.)
18 Spannell v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 418, 203 S. W. 357, 2 A. L. R.. 593
(1918). Here the defendant killed one Butler and his wife with one shot.
He was acquitted of killing the wife. Plea of former jeopardy was sustained
to a later prosecution for the death of Butler, the court stating, "Where
there is one act, one intent, one volition .. .the appellant cannot be convicted
upon an act, intent, and volition for which he had been previously acquitted."
However, in Skelton v. State, 110 Tex. Cr. R. 621, 10 S. W. (2d) 554 (1928),
defendant shot at two men, both of whom fell. One got up and began to run.
Defendant shot again, wounding him. Held, that there were two separate
assaults upon the second man.
'9 United States v. Barnhart, 22 F. 285 (1884) ; Wragg v. Penn Township,
94 Ill. 11 (1879).
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To the same effect would be the case where the one act causes
violation of two local laws, as, for example, the illegal sale of
20
liquor on Sunday.
A close application of this view, however, could result in much
confusion. Suppose the case of a person who, driving at an
excessive rate of speed, should run over and fatally injure a man,
and then continue on at the same high rate of speed only to kill
another person a mile away. Clearly the courts would hold that
these would constitute two separate acts and two separate offenses, being violations of the one law. But suppose the killings
occurred twenty-five feet or only five feet apart. Would these
be construed as two separate acts or as one continuous act? If
the victims were arm-in-arm companions it might be treated as
one act, but would the same result follow if they were utter
strangers accidentally present at the same time ? So too, probably, the occurrence would constitute one act if both were injured
as a result of one type of negligent conduct, as driving at an
excessive rate of speed. But what if A is struck while defendant
was speeding, and B is almost instantaneously thereafter injured
because defendant turned to look back to see what he had done
to A and consequently failed to observe B's presence? Such problems could seriously vex the states following the doctrine of the
Cosgrove case or the Wheelock decision, but no difficulty could
be encountered in the states following the rule of the instant
case, as each act would result in a separate crime.
The opposing view, that double Jeopardy should be measured
in terms of victims, rests on an entirely different foundation. No
one would dispute that each victim or his representative could
maintain an independent suit to enforce the civil liability. Each
is deemed to have a separate right, and each is entitled to his own
action to vindicate the same. In its early concept, the criminal
liability of the defendant arose from conduct which, while breaching the peace, was particular to the victim-so much so that
the victim was obliged to initiate the prosecution by raising the
hue and cry. 21 The action was, therefore, measured in terms of
the persons harmed rather than the law invaded. Naturally,
when two or more persons were simultaneously injured, it was
the duty of each to sound the alarm as each was the offended
party; hence two prosecutions would result. While the passing
of years has changed the procedure in bringing the offender to
justice and while, today, the prosecution is primarily predicated
20 Commonwealth v. William Sheehan, 105 Mass. 192 (1870).
21

Holdsworth's History of English Law (3rd ed.), I, 294.
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for the vindication of the single right of the state, rather than
that of the victim, the old theory of the personality of the offense
still clings in the law. Thus every indictment charging a crime
against a person or property must name the victim or owner,2
and such statement is deemed essential so as to prevent a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 23 Likewise, the rules
against duplicity in criminal pleading prevent the joining of
several offenses in one count, and those against misjoinder regulate the inclusion of several charges in the one indictment. So
also the rules of evidence generally prevent the introduction of
proof of crimes against other persons.2 4 Moreover, the general
test applied where double jeopardy is claimed is to see whether
the proof offered in the first case would also prove the second
26
charge, 25 and if it varies then there has been no jeopardy.
Hence, every effort is made to provide for an orderly prosecution
of the defendant for each crime that he has committed instead
of the lumping of many prosecutions into one. These distinctions
are preserved under the rule adopted by the Illinois court and
should rightly be recognized. It may be urged that the rule
may be burdensome to the accused, but it certainly simplifies the
problems of the prosecution. Historically, then, the decision in
the Allen case is not without foundation.
G. KLOE
EXECUTORS

AND

ADMINISTRATORS-ALLOWANCE

OF CLAIMS--WHETHER

CLAIM OF UNITED

AND PAYMENT

STATES GOVERNMENT

FILED MORE THAN
ONE YEAR AFTER GRANTING OF LETTERS. In Harrison v.
Deutsch,' the United States Collector of Internal Revenue filed
a claim against the estate of Joseph Deutsch for additional
IS PAYABLE OUT OF ALL ASSETS ALTHOUGH

income taxes for 1929, 1931, and 1932. The claim was filed more
than one year after the granting of letters testamentary in the
Probate Court of Cook County. The court allowed the claim
as a class 2A claim, 2 whereupon the executrix appealed to the
People v. Robertson, 284 Ill. 620, 120 N. E. 539 (1918).
People v. Jennings,'298 11. 286, 131 N. E. 619 (1921) ; Memorandum,
3 Dyer 285a, 73 Eng. Rep. 639 (1496).
24 People v. King, 276 Ill. 138, 114 N. E. 601 (1916).
25 Reynolds v. The People, 83 Ill. 479 (1876).
26 People v. Fox, 269 Il1. 300, 110 N. E. 26 (1915).
1 294 Ill. App. 8,13 N. E. (2d) 511 (1938).
2 "Priority of Debts due the United States in the Administration of
Estates-An Omitted But Implied Section of The Illinois Administration
Act," by John F. O'Connell, Judge of Probate Court of Cook County, State
of Illinois.
22
23
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Circuit Court of Cook County, and upon a trial de novo the
claim was there allowed as a sixth class claim under the statutes
and was only to be paid out of subsequently inventoried assets.
The tax collector appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court,
which reversed the action of the Circuit Court and held that
the claim was to be allowed as a class 2A claim and was to be
entitled to priority over all claims except funeral expenses, costs
of administration, and widow's award. The claim was held to be
payable out of all assets notwithstanding that it was not filed
within one year from the granting of letters of administration
and that the Illinois statute expressly provides that such claims
are payable only out of subsequently inventoried assets.
If the Illinois provision 4 is to be construed merely as a statute
of limitations, obviously the United States would not be affected
thereby 5 in its claims against the decedent inasmuch as Congress
has manifested no intention to the contrary.6 A dissenting
opinion, however, upholds the contention of the executrix that
the claim should be limited to payment from subsequently inventoried assets, upon the basis that the section is not a statute
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 3, § 71, by which all claims are divided into six
classes: (1) funeral expenses and costs of administration, (2) widow's
award, (3) expenses attending last illness, (4) debts due the common school
fund or township, (5) moneys received by the decedent in trust, and (6) all
other debts and demands which shall be exhibited to the court within one
year from the granting of letters by the probate court. All claims of whatever
class and demand not exhibited to the probate court within one year from
the granting of letters shall be forever barred as to all property and estate of
the deceased which has been inventoried or accounted for by the administrator
or executor. The statute further provides that claims filed after the one year
period are to be paid only out of subsequently inventoried assets.
4 Ibid.
5 United States v. Fidelity Trust Co., 121 F. 766 (1903), action on bond
of public officer; United States v. Hoar, 26 Fed. Cas. 329, 2 Mason 311
(1821), action against administrator for money had and received; Pond v.
Dougherty, 6 Cal. App. 686, 92 P. 1035 (1907), claim against deceased surety
of Collector of Internal Revenue; United States v. Backus, Fed. Cas. 14,491,
6 McLean 443 (1855), action against executor to recover a balance due from
the estate of the deceased, where the following language appears: "The
exclusive jurisdiction given to the probate court, in the settlement of decedents' estates, cannot affect the claims of the government, however it may
bear on private claims. The mode of proceeding in the probate court, and
the time given for the settlement of accounts, cannot regulate the claims of
the government, nor affect the remedies given to it under its own laws ....
The federal government being entitled to a priority over other creditors ...
no injustice is done to the general creditors."
6 Davis v. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 287 F. 522 (1923), action by
Federal government to recover demurrage charges incurred by the defendant
while railroads were being operated by federal government; United States v.
Koleno, 226 F. 180 (1915), suit to recover value of lands patented to defendant; United States v. Norris, 222 F. 14 (1915), suit to cancel patent of
land: Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 51 S. Ct. 608, 75 L. Ed. 1289
(1930). deficiency assessment against corporation.
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of limitations but one creating vested property rights in those
7
who have filed their claims within the prescribed period.
The Illinois cases construing this section agree that it is not
to be treated as a general statute of limitations taking away all
remedy, both personal and against the property of the decedent,
but that it is a specific act adopted for the purpose of facilitating
the early settlement of estates.8 The failure to file a claim within
the time required by the statute does not bar the claim itself but
only the right to claim a distributive share in the property
already inventoried.9
It has been held that the state of Illinois in failing to file its
claim against a decedent's estate within the one year period is
bound by the statute and can seek payment only from subsequently inventoried assets in the event the claim is allowed.10
This decision is relied upon by the dissenting judge in the instant
case as a reason why the United States should likewise be bound,
and he cites United States v. Haley,1 1 wherein the court held
that whenever the United States is compelled to come into the
state courts to enforce its rights it must come in as any other
suitor.
7

Citing Peacock v. Haven, 22 I1. 23 (1859).

8 Alderson v. Alderson's Estate, 226 Il. App. 176 (1922); Durflnger v.

Arnold, 329 Ill. 93, 160 N. E. 172 (1928) ; Pufahl v. Parks, 299 U. S. 217,
57 S. Ct. 151, 81 L. Ed. 133 (1936), claim of receiver of insolvent national
bank against estate of deceased stockholder to enforce stockholder's liability;
Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 I11. 124, 46 N. E. 197 (1896) ; Smith v. Preston,
82 I11.App. 285 (1898) ; Peacock v. Haven, 22 Ill. 23 (1859), assumpsit on
promissory note brought by administrator, with a setoff by defendant;
People v. Small, 319 Ill. 437, 150 N. E. 435 (1925), equity suit for accounting
against state treasurer brought after one year from the granting of letters
testamentary.
9 Pearson v. McBean, 231 Ill. 536, 83 N. E. 173 (1907) ; Morse v. Pacific
Ry. Co., 191 Ill. 356, 61 N. E. 104 (1901) ; Smith v. Preston, 82 Ill. App. 285
(1898) ; Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Ill. 124, 46 N. E. 197 (1896) ; Mulvey v.
Johnson, 90 Ill. 457 (1878); Blanchard v. Williamson, 70 III. 647 (1873);
Peacock v. Haven, 22 Ill. 23 (1859) ; Judy v. Kelley, 11 111. 211 (1849),action
of debt upon a judgment brought against administrator; Mackin v. Haven,
187 I1. 480, 58 N. E. 448 (1900) ; Hallgren v. Utt, 155 Ill. App. 640 (1910).
In such case, the judgment allowing the claim should be a special one
corresponding to the common law judgment of quando acciderint (when
they shall come in). Such a judgment was sometimes given against an executor or administrator, especially on a plea of plene administravit, which
empowers the plaintiff to have the benefit of assets which may thereafter
come into the possession of the executor or administrator. It is also termed
a judgment of assets in futuro. For cases, see Darling v. McDonald, 101 Ill.
370 (1882), Shepard v. National Bank of Lawrence County, 67 I1. 292
(1873) ; Russell v. Hubbard, 59 Ill. 335 (1871) ; Peacock v. Haven, 22 Ill.
23 (1859) ; Bradford v. Jones, 17 I1. 92 (1855) ; Judy v. Kelley, 11 I1. 211
(1849); Thorn v. Watson, 5 Gilm. 26 (1848).
10 People v. Small, 319 Il. 437, 50 N. E. 435 (1925).
11 2 Ida. 26, 3 P. 263 (1882).
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Other jurisdictions having statutory provisions similar to those
appearing in the Illinois statute and herein involved are in accord
with the view that the creditor who files a belated claim will be
inventoried assets in the
entitled to share in the subsequently
12
event the claim is allowed.
Notice must be taken, however, of certain provisions appearing
in the federal statutes.' By virtue of these sections the United
States is given a priority over claims against a decedent's estate
in the hands of an administrator or executor where there are
insufficient funds to pay all claims.
It has been held that taxes due the United States are "debts"
within the meaning of the statute. 14 Hence tax claims would
enjoy a priority over other claims. The priority given to the
United States is subordinate to a valid, specific existing lien in
favor of a creditor, 15 but government claims will take precedence
over claims which may constitute general liens which have not
12 First National Bank of Denver v. Hotchkiss, 49 Colo. 593, 114 P. 310
(1911), action against administrator to recover upon decedent's statutory
liability as stockholder; McClure v. LaPlata County, 23 Colo. 130, 46 P. 677
(1896), action against administrator to recover taxes collected by decedent
in his lifetime and unaccounted for at his death; Townsend v. Thompson,
24 Colo. 411, 51 P. 433 (1897), assumpsit on promissory note given by
decedent; Durston v. Pollock, 91 Iowa 668, 60 N. W. 221 (1894) ; Littlefield
v. Eaton, 74 Me. 516 (1883), assumpsit on promissory note; Fay v. Haskell,
207 Mass. 207, 93 N. E. 641 (1911), creditor filing claim after statutory
period had elapsed; Holland v. Cruft, 20 Pick. 321 (Mass., 1838), bill in
-equity; Jordan v. Logue, 76 N. J. Eq. 471, 79 A. 426 (1909) ; Cunningham
v. Stanford, 69 N. J. L. 9, 54 A. 245 (1903), action to recover upon promissory note indorsed by defendant's testator; Terhune -. White, 34 N. J. Eq.
98 (1881).
13 31 U. S. C. A. § 191, which provides: "Whenever any person indebted
to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased
debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay
all debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be
"
first satisfied ..
§ 192 provides: "Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person, who pays any debt due by the person or the estate from whom or for
which he acts, before he satisfies the debts due to the United States from
such person or estate, shall become answerable in his own person and
estate for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much thereof as
may remain due and unpaid."
14 Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492, 46 S. Ct. 180, 70 L. Ed. 373
(1925) ; Hatch v. Morosco Holding Co., Inc., 61 F. (2d) 944 (1932) ; Stover
v. Scotch Hills Coal Co., 4 F. (2d) 748 (1924) ; but see Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Johnson Shipyards Corp., 300 F. 952 (1924), which held that the
United States government is entitled to priority in payment of income

taxes due from an insolvent taxpayer, such right being an attribute of
sovereignty and not dependent on the statute. In re Wyley Co., 292 F. 900
(1923).
15 Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co. of New York, 26 U. S. 386, 1 Pet. 386,
7 L. Ed. 189 (1828), which states, "But it has never yet been decided by this
court that the priority of the United States will devest a specific lien attached
to a thing, whether it be accompanied by possession or not."
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been specifically enforced. 16 The priority given under the United
States Code is also subordinate to necessary expenses of administration of the decedent's estate, 17 and it has also been held that
the decedent's reasonable funeral expenses have priority over
his debts due the United States for income taxes.' 8
A debt due the United States is to be preferred to the expenses
of last illness, but where they have been paid by the administrator without notice of the claim of the government, the
government's priority will be lost.19 It would seem, therefore,
that the Appellate Court was correct in allowing the claim as
a class 2A claim. The federal statute would of necessity have to
be considered with the Illinois provisions regarding the filing
of claims against a decedent's estate.
F. J. NovoTNY
INSURANCE-RISKS

AND

CAUSES

UTORY DEFINITION OF "RIOT"

OF Loss-WHETHER

STAT-

SHOULD CONTROL CONSTRUCTION

OF INSURANCE PoLimiEs.-The term "riot" is used in insurance

policies in two distinctly different capacities. It may be put in
the policy to give the policyholder protection in case of loss by
riot, or it may be put in a fire, theft, robbery, or liability policy
to excuse the insurance company from liability in case the loss
is caused by riot.' Thus, in the one case, the term "riot" is the
friend and ally of the policyholder, and in the other case it is
the stout defender of the insurance company. We are interested
in what constitutes riot in Illinois in these two situations.
In the case of Walter v. Northern Insurance Company of New
York, 2 plaintiff sued on a general insurance policy with a riot
16 Thelusson v. Smith, 15 U. S. 396, 2 Wheat. 396, 4 L. Ed. 271 (1817),
where the United States was given priority over a judgment creditor who
had not obtained execution and levy; United States v. Duncan, Fed. Cas.
15,003, 4 McLean 607 (1850), reported also in 12 I1. 523. In New York v.
Maclay, 288 U. S. 290, 53 S. Ct. 323, 77 L. Ed. 754 (1932), the United
States filed its claim for additional income taxes with the receiver of an
insolvent corporation. The state of New York also filed its claim for other
taxes. The court held that the debt owed the United States had priority
under 31 U. S. C. A. § 191. To the same effect, see United States v. Knott,
298 U. S.544, 56 S. Ct. 902, 80 L. Ed. 1321, 104 A. L. R. 741 (1935).
17 United States v. gggleston, Fed. Cas. 15,027, 4 Sawyer 199 (1877). Suit
brought by United States against administrator of surety on army paymaster's bond; expenses of last illness had been paid out by administrator in
good faith without notice of the claim of the government.
18 United States v. Eggleston, Fed. Cas. 15,027, 4 Sawyer 199 (1877);
In re Stile's Estate, 215 N. Y. S.134 (1926).
19 United States v. Eggleston, Fed. Cas. 15,027, 4 Sawyer 199 (1877).
1 The excepting clause usually reads, "This policy does not apply to loss
caused directly or indirectly by invasion, insurrection, riot, etc."
2 294 Ill. App. 133, 13 N. E. (2d) 660 (1938).
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clause attached. The loss for which claim was made consisted of
the smearing and daubing of creosote over the interior of the
house at night by two or more persons, unobserved, during the
absence of the occupants of the house. Recovery was sought
under the clause protecting the plaintiff against damage from
riot. It was held in the Illinois Appellate Court that these facts
entitled the policyholder to recover for damage by riot according to the meaning of that term as defined by the Illinois Criminal Code.3
First we seek to find where the court should look for a definition of riot. In a layman's dictionary, riot is defined as "disorderly behavior; disorder; uproar; tumult. "4 At common law,
" . . . riot is commonly defined as a tumultuous disturbance of
the peace by three or more persons, assembled and acting with a
common intent; either in executing a lawful private enterprise
in a violent and turbulent manner, to the terror of the people,
or in executing an unlawful enterprise in a violent and turbulent
manner. "5

In both of the above definitions, "tumult" is an essential characteristic of riot, and at common law a minimum of three persons were necessary. However, in Illinois for more than sixty
years, the statutory definition of riot, at least for criminal purposes, has read, "If two or more persons actually do an unlawful act, with force or violence, against the person or property of
another, with or without a common cause of quarrel, or even do a
lawful act in a violent or tumultuous manner, the persons so
offending shall be deemed guilty of a riot, and shall severally be
fined not exceeding $200, or confined in the county jail not
exceeding six months. "
In the case in question, the court chose the definition most
favorable to the plaintiff. It is a general rule in Illinois and elsewhere that an insurance contract is to be construed according
to the intention of the parties as indicated by the policy, just as
in the case of any other contract, 7 and that words in an
insurance policy, unless they are obviously intended to be
8 Ill. Rev. Stats. 1937, Ch. 38, § 504.
4 Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.: 1934).
5 54 C. J. 828, § 1.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, loc. cit. The difference between riot and assault and
battery is that two or more persons must be engaged in the unlawful act
to constitute riot, while but one is needed for assault and battery. Freeland
v. People, 16 I1. 380 (1855).
7 Belleville Enameling & Stamping Company v. United States Casualty
Company, 266 I1. App. 586 (1932); Irvin v. Metropolitan-Hibernia Fire
Insurance Company, 247 II1.App. 562 (1928).
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given a mere technical connotation, will be given the meaning that common speech imports. However, this principle
is always qualified by the statement that, where there is
any ambiguity or doubt as to the meaning of the parties,
the policy will be construed strictly against the insurance company.8 This is because the insurance companies draft their own
contracts and have an opportunity to qualify the terms of policies in any way they see fit. This principle of strict construction
against the company is usually followed even where a standard
policy, the terms of which are entirely beyond the control of the
insurance companies, has been adopted by statute.9 The courts
will almost invariably try to construe the policy to avoid forfeiture of the rights of the insured, if this is possible. 10
With the above in mind, consider an Indiana case 1' in which,
in order to aid the insurance company, the court followed the
statutory definition of riot. In that case the plaintiff sued for
loss by fire, and the defense was that the fire was caused by a
riot. The excepting clause in the policy said that the insurance
company should not be liable for fires caused by riot. Five
masked men forcibly broke into the house at night, compelled
the occupant to vacate, and burned down the building. The
insurance company said that this was a riot; the court looked
at the Indiana statute and agreed that it was a riot, and the
policyholder got nothing. This would seem to support the Illinois
attitude that a statute is a good place to look for the meaning
of words in an insurance contract.
An even more interesting case came before the English House
of Lords in 1924.12 The plaintiff had a policy protecting him
s Monahan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 283 Il1. 136, 119
N. E. 68 (1918); Peterson v. Manhattan Life Insurance Company, 244 Il1.
329, 91 N. E. 466 (1910).
9 Matthews v. American Central Insurance Company, 154 N. Y. 449, 48
N. E. 751 (1897); Smith v. National Fire Insurance Company, 175 N. C.
314, 95 S. E. 562 (1918) ; Levinton v. Ohio Farmers' Insurance Company,
267 Pa. 448, 110 A. 295 (1920).
10 32 C. J. 1296, citing Budelman v. American Ins. Co., 297 Ill. 222, 130
N. E. 513 (1921); Norwaysz v. Thuringia Ins. Co., 204 Ill. 334, 68 N. E.
551 (1903).
11 Germania Fire Insurance Company v. Deckard, 3 Ind. App. 361, 28
N. E. 868 (1891). The doctrine of this case is stated in 26 C. J. 343, § 437,
as follows: "The exception relating to loss from a fire caused by a riot
relieves the insurer from liability, where such a condition exists, as determined by the usual legal definition of a riot."
12 London and Lancaster Fire Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Bolands, Ltd.,
[19241 A. C. 836. There is an interesting comment on this case in the
Solicitor's Journal and Weekly Reporter, 69 Sol. J. 223 (1925). This comment points out that this was the first occasion in England in which an
insurance company pleaded that an ordinary robbery unattended by any
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against loss by robbery at his bakery; four armed men entered at
ten o'clock at night, held up employees with revolvers, and took
away £1,250. The insured sought his money under the robbery
policy, but the insurance company claimed that the robbery,
in addition to being a robbery, was an indictable riot under
English law, so that defendant ought not to be liable. Two Irish
courts favored the plaintiff. Then the question came to the House
of Lords on appeal, and that body had no trouble in finding that,
where there is a riot in the technical view of the criminal law,
there is a riot in insurance law. And the plaintiff did not get
his £1,250. Yet it would seem perfectly plain that, if the plaintiff
had had the good fortune to be robbed by only two persons of
the same sum under the same circumstances, he would have won
the case - because three persons are necessary to riot in
England. 18
These views lead to some interesting speculations in regard to
the Illinois statutory definition of riot and its application to
insurance policies. Technically, a homeowner with insurance
protection against loss by riot ought to be able to recover if
two vagrants trespassed on his property and tossed cigarettes
in the weeds, setting the house on fire. All the statute requires
for riot is an unlawful, forcible act against the plaintiff's property by two or more persons. Suppose that, under the same
facts, the plaintiff had been insured against loss by fire unless the
fire was caused by riot. Then plaintiff could not recover, because
the fire would have been caused by a riot. Yet if there had been
only one vagrant trespassing, the homeowner could have recovered, because there is no riot in Illinois unless there are two or
more people participating.
Perhaps these are extreme examples; yet it is doubtful that
they would sound extreme to the plaintiff in the English case
whose £1,250 are gone forever. The Illinois court, in the
principal case, unequivocally committed itself to the Illinois
criminal statute for the definition of riot, and future litigants
will be quick to point to the statute to gain their ends, perhaps
to the embarrassment of the court. The term "riot" is to be
tumultuous civil disturbance should be called a riot in order to defeat the
policyholder. The writer suggested that owners of goods and chattels desiring insurance against theft, robbery, and burglary must take care that the
riot excepting clause is qualified. Otherwise nearly every armed robbery
by three or more persons (in England) would by its very nature defeat
recovery on the policy because such a robbery contains the elements of an
indictable riot.
18 -Rex v. Billingham, 2 Car. & P. 234, 172 Eng. Rep. 106 (1825).
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found in the excepting clauses of fire, theft, burglary, and other
policies in force today, so that the instant case will perhaps be
cited frequently in future litigation.
L. N. CONKLIN
LIENS-EQUITABLE LIENS-WHETHER VENDEE HAS LIEN FOR
PAYMENTS UNDER VOID CONTRACT OF PURCHASE.-In

Shepherd v.

Dougan,' a husband sold community realty under a contract
which was void because the wife, although named in the contract
with the husband, did not join in signing or acknowledging it.
The husband accepted the purchaser's payments of installments,
repairs, taxes, and insurance premiums. He acquired full title
to the realty upon the death of his wife and continued to accept
such payments. Upon the subsequent failure of the purchaser's
administratrix to make a payment when due, the vendor conveyed the property and assigned the contract to third persons
who had notice of the circumstances. Upbn an action of ejectment,
the administratrix filed a cross-bill for an equitable lien.. The lien
was allowed for the vendee's expenditures less a reasonable rental
value for the period of the purchaser's possession.
The doctrine of the venpdee's lien was first announced in
England, in 1757, as dictum in Burgess v. Wheate.2 where an
analogy was drawn to a vendor's lien. This dictum was recognized by Lord Eldon in Mackreth v. Symmons, 3 in 1808, but it
was not until 1855 that the question arose directly, in Wythes v.
Lee. 4 Then, although the vendee was not in possession and there
were no special equities, he was given a lien for the money he had
paid upon the principle and authority of the two preceding
cases. The question reached the House of Lords in 1864. 5 It was
unanimously decided that where an owner contracts with a purchaser for the sale of an estate, the ownership is, in equity, transferred by the contract. Consequently, every portion of the
1 76 P. (2d) 442 (Ida., 1937, rehearing den. 1938).
2 1 Eden 177 at 211, 28 Eng. Rep. 652 at 665 (1757), where the court
said: "And as to the vendor's keeping both the estate and the money, it is
analogous to what equity does in another case; as where conveyance is
made prematurely before money paid, the money is considered as a lien on
that estate in the hands of the vendee. So, where the money is paid prematurely, the money would be considered as a lien on the estate in the hands
of the vendor ......
3 15 Ves. Jr. 329 at 344, 33 Eng. Rep. 778 at 784 (1808).
4 3 Drew. 396, 61 Eng. Rep. 954 (1855).
The vendor entered into a
contract for the sale of land and accepted part payment and advances for
insurance and improvements. The vendee refused to complete the contract
because of the inability of the vendor to make good title. A demurrer to a
bill for the declaration of a lien was overruled.
5 Rose v. Watson, 10 H. L. Cas. 672, 11 Eng. Rep. 1187 (1864).
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purchase money paid is part performance of the contract, and a
lien attaches to the extent of the money paid.
Two early American decisions6 reached the result later enunciated in England in Wythes v. Lee,7 but it was not until 1841
that a definite foundation was formed on which the vendee's lien
could rest. The case of Bright v. Boyd 8 arose under the following
circumstances. Bright was in possession of property through
intermediate conveyances from the administrator with will annexed of the father of Boyd. The administrator's deed was void
because of his failure to comply with certain requirements of the
law essential to the validity of the sale. After Boyd had recovered a judgment in an action of ejectment, Bright filed a bill
in equity to have his improvements made a charge upon the land.
Judge Story considered a previous New York decision, 9 in which
such a request had not been granted because no decisions could
be found on the subject, but refused to be limited because there
was no precedent in English or American law. He allowed the
lien, saying, "I wish, in coming to this conclusion, to be distinctly understood as affirming and maintaining the broad doctrine, as a doctrine of equity, that so far as an innocent purchaser
for a valuable consideration, without notice of any infirmity in
his title, has, by his improvements and meliorations, added to the
permanent value of the estate, he is entitled to full remuneration; and that such increase in value is a lien and charge upon
the estate, which the absolute owner is bound to discharge, before
he is restored to his original rights in the land. This is the
clear result of the Roman law; and it has the most persuasive
equity and I might add common sense and common justice for its
foundation." This reasoning was widely adopted, 10 and under
6 In Newman v. Maclin, 6 Tenn. 241 (1813), a court rescinded a bargain
upon inability of the vendor to make good title and allowed the vendee a lien
for the money paid. In Griffith v. Depew, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 177 (1820).
a vendee who went into possession and made improvements was allowed a
vendee's lien for the money spent less a reasonable rental for the property.
7 3 Drew. 396, 61 Eng. Rep. 954 (1855).
8 Fed. Cas. No. 1875, 1 Story 478 (1841) ; Fed. Cas. No. 1876, 2 Story
605 (1841).
9 Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 390 (1837).
10 In Vall6's Heirs v. Fleming's Heirs, 29 Mo. 152 (1859), one judge dissented on the ground that a person paying his money under a void sale was
a mere volunteer. In Blodgett v. Hitt, 29 Wis. 169 (1871), the sale was void
for want of proper notice of sale under order of Probate Court, and the lien
was allowed. Union Hall Ass'n v. Morrison, 39 Md. 281 (1873) ; Thomas v.
Thomas' Executor, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 420 (1855) ; Hatcher v. Briggs, 6 Ore.
32 (1876). In Herring & Bird v. Pollards' Executors, 23 Tenn. 362 (1843),
a purchaser in possession of land under a parol contract, later rescinded as
void, was allowed to recover the purchase price and value of improvements,
less a reasonable rental. In Humphreys v. Holtsinger, 35 Tenn. 227 (1855),
the vendor rescinded, and the vendee was allowed to recover the purchase
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similar circumstances a lien was allowed in South Dakota in
1928.11 Parsons v. Moses 12 followed Judge Story's doctrine and
further explained that, while the English and American common
law permitted the owner of land to recover his property without
liability to pay for improvements put upon it by an occupant
without title, chancery had properly adopted the civil law rule
of natural equity and would compel the true owner to pay for
improvements made by a bona fide possessor.
The same principle was applied to contracts entered into with
married women for the sale of their real estate' 3 on the basis
that it would contravene the plainest principles of justice to
allow a married woman to get possession of property under an
and to let her repudiate her
engagement not binding upon her
14
contract and keep the property.
money paid and the value of his improvements. In Wright v. Yates, 140
Ky. 283, 130 S. W. 1111 (1910), a purchaser went into possession and paid
the purchase money under a parol contract. When the vendor sold the land
to third persons, the vendee was allowed to retain possession and was given
a lien on the land for repayment as long as he retained possession. In Rhea
v. Allison, 40 Tenn. 176 (1859), the court said: "... . a Court of equity will
directly and actively . . . make him compensation to the full value of all his
improvements, to the extent they have enhanced the value of the land,
deducting rents and profits, and will treat the land as subject to a lien
therefor ....
This equity exists so soon as the improvements are made."
Lyttle v. Davidson, 23 Ky. L. 2262, 67 S. W. 34 (1902); North v. Bunn,
122 N. C. 766, 29 S. E. 776 (1898) ; Franklin Finance Co. v. Bowden, 36
Ohio App. 19, 172 N. E. 698 (1930) ; Pratt v. Weeks, 1 F. Supp. 953 (1932),
where, the contract not being specifically enforceable and vendee being entitled to rescission in equity, an equitable lien was imposed upon the subject
matter of the contract to secure restitution; Bullitt v. Eastern Kentucky Land
Co., 99 Ky. 324, 36 S. W. 16 (1896) ; Cleveland v. Bergen Bldg. & Imp. Co.,
55 A. 117 (N. J. Ch., 1903); Aday v. Echols, 18 Ala. 353, 52 Am. Dec.
225 (1850). In Swetitsch v. Waskow, 37 Ill. App. 155 (1890), the vendee
took possession, made partial payment, paid taxes and made improvements
and, upon the vendor's refusal to perform, was allowed a lien on the premises
for the amount paid. The lien was said to be of the equitable kind and a
court of equity the appropriate place for its enforcement. See also Murray v.
Hill, 60 Ill. App. 80 (1894).
11 Spotts v. Wolf, 53 S. D. 108, 220 N. W. 495 (1928).
12 16 Iowa 440 (1864).
13 In Pilcher and Cataulis v. Smith, 39 Tenn. 208 (1858), a contract with
a femme covert was rescinded and the court ordered the repayment of the
purchase price and declared a lien upon the land to secure repayment. In
Pierson v. Lum, 25 N. J. Eq. 390 (1874), a court of equity charged the
estate with the money paid and the value of the improvements put upon
the land with the vendor's knowledge and consent. In Newman v. Moore,
94 Ky. 147, 21 S. W. 759, 42 Am. St. Rep. 343 (1893), a vendee who had
paid part of the purchase price, given notes for the balance, and gone into
possession was allowed a lien for the amount paid because of the refusal of
a married woman to convey her land under the contract.
14 Burns v. McGregor, 90 N. C. 240 (1884).
In Sautelle v. Carlisle, 13
Lea (Tenn.) 391 (1884), the lien was allowed and held to be good against
a subsequent purchaser with notice. But see Wright v. Begley, 31 Ky. L. 53,
101 S. W. 342 (1907), where the lien was not allowed because the money
was paid to the husband and the wife received no part of it.
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A distinction is made, however, and no lien is allowed where
the vendor is totally lacking in power to convey 15 or the right of
a bona fide purchaser for value has intervened.16
Some American decisions, drawing an analogy between the
vendor's lien and the vendee's lien and stating that the foundation is the same in either case, 17 follow the lead of the early
English courts. This doctrine makes the contract under which
the money is paid the basis of the lien.18 The New York court
goes one step further to say that the lien of the purchaser for
the amount paid on an executory contract for the purchase of
land is dependent on the existence of the contract and does not
survive its rescission whether rescission is by act of the purchaser or by decree of court on the ground of fraud practiced on
the purchaser by the vendor. 19 This theory was followed in
15

In Paton v. Robinson, 81 Conn. 547, 71 A. 730 (1909), a lien was not

allowed where land was purchased from a widow, the title in fact being in
the husband's heirs and the widow having no authority to contract or to
create a lien upon their interest.
16 Fowles v. Bentley, 135 Mo. App. 417, 115 S. W. 1090 (1909), where,
since a purchaser of land had neither constructive nor actual notice of a
prior contract of sale, the prior purchaser was not allowed a lien on the
land under the contract. In O'Neill v. Bennett, 49 S. D. 524, 207 N. W. 543
(1926), the wife refused to consent to her husband's conveyance of land constituting a homestead. The husband subsequently conveyed the land to the
wife for value. The first conveyance by the husband was void by statute.
The court found that the wife was an intervening good faith purchaser and
that a vendee's lien applies only to land the vendor has a right to convey. A
contract for sale, or deed, void from the beginning because of lack of a
vendor's power to transfer premises cannot be the foundation of a vendee's
lien.
7 Farmer and Arnold v. Samuel, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 187, 14 Am. Dec. 106
(1823), where the court said: "Both the vendor and purchaser of lands have
their mutual liens, the former for the purchase money due to him, and the latter for what he has paid, in case it is to be restored to him." In Gerstell v.
Shirk, 210 F. 223 (1913), a contract for the sale of land was not executed because of the inability of the vendor to give a merchantable title. A vendee's
lien was allowed for the amount of the purchase price paid, on the basis that
the vendee's lien is the counterpart of the vendor's lien. In Howard v. Linnhaven Orchard Co., 228 F. 523 (1913), the vendor was unable to give a good
title and the court said: "According to the great weight of authority, a vendee
is vested with a lien for the amount of the purchase price paid upon a
contract for the purchase of real property. By an equitable conversion, the
purchaser becomes the owner of the land contracted for (equitable though
his title may be), while the vendor retains the legal title, but in trust for the
purchaser. Every advancement of purchase money increases the vendee's

interest in the realty purchased, and there is no just reason why the vendee's
right to a lien is not just as strong as that of the vendor. The principle
upon which such a lien is founded is the same in either case." This reasoning is very similar to that used in Rose v. Watson, 10 H. L. Cas. 672, 11

Eng. Rep. 1187 (1864).
18
Flickinger v..Glass, 170 N. Y. S. 459 (1918).
19 Davis v. Rosenzweig Realty Operating Co., 192 N. Y. 128, 84 N. E.

943, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 175, 127 Am. St. Rep. 890 (1908). Compare
Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 113, 84 N. E. 937, 127 Am. St. Rep. 862, 15
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21
Michigan 20 for a short time but later was expressly oirerruled.
to
indicate
that
the
vendee's
equiBetter reason would seem
table title or lien upon the land is not the corollary of the vendor's
equitable title to the purchase money or lien upon the land.2 2 The
vendor's lien is given to secure the payment of money expressly
or impliedly agreed to be paid and, therefore, has its basis in,
and is an incident to, the contract. The vendee's lien, on the other
hand, is given to secure the return of purchase money. This
arrangement is not contemplated by the agreement and is inconsistent with it. The vendee's lien, therefore, is not the result of
any contract but is a result that may arise from the requirements
of equity alone.21 It should be regarded as a remedial device for
the purpose of guaranteeing restitution.
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, it would
seem that the court reached a just and equitable decision. While,
ordinarily, equity will not aid a person who is in default,2 4 and
this default did precipitate the repudiation and conveyance by
the vendor, the court rationalized the present situation on the
ground that a purchaser could not be in default under a void
contract. Furthermore, the equities of the situation were not
changed by the omission on the part of the vendee. The rights of
the parties were no greater immediately before the omission than
afterwards, nor were they any less. The vendor could not
have compelled payment, nor after payment could the vendee
have compelled a transfer of the property. The third persons

Ann. Cas. 819 (1908), where a lien was allowed upon the inability of the
vendor to make a good marketable title. The court found that such a lien
does not depend upon express contract but is created by equity because
required by natural equitable principles. This was the basis of a dissenting
opinion in Davis v. Rosenzweig. See Montgomery v. Meyerstein, 186 Cal.
459, 199 P. 800 (1921).
In
20 Van Hoene v. Barber, 215 Mich. 538, 184 N. W. 526 (1921).
Mulheron v. Henry S. Koppin Co., 221 Mich. 187, 190 N. W. 674 (1922),
the contract was rescinded by the vendee and cancelled by a court of equity
on the ground of fraud. A vendee's lien was refused, since the right to such
a lien must be based on contract and is lost by rescission.
21 Witte v. Hobolth, 224 Mich. 286, 195 N. W. 82 (1923), in which the
court held that-the power to decree a lien to the purchaser does not spring
from the contract. It is found in the broad powers of a court of equity.
The contract does not give the power, nor can it take the power away.
22 Larson v. Metcalf, 201 Iowa 1208, 207 N. W. 382, 45 A. L. R. 344
(1926) ; Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. Jr. 329, 33 Eng. Rep. 778 (1808).
Compare William F. Walsh, A Treatise On Equity (Chicago: Callaghan
and Company, 1930), 433, where the reasoning is similar to that found in the
cases cited in footnote 17 supra.
23 Whitbread & Co., Ltd. v. Watt, [19021 1 Ch. (Eng.) 835.
24 Rainer v. Huddleston, 51 Tenn. 223 (1871) ; Dinn v. Grant, 5 De G. &
Sm. 451, 64 Eng. Rep. 1194 (1852) ; Merrill v. Merrill, 103 Cal. 287, 35 P.

768 (1894).
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who took the land with notice of the circumstances were in no
better position than the vendor.25 The decision is a good example
of the power of a court of equity to exercise its discretion to further justice and fair dealing.
J. R. SCOTT
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAXES-WHETHER TAX UPON A R.MAINDER SUBJECT OF PowER OF APPOINTMENT SHALL BE ASSESSED
AT DEATH OF DONOR UPON ASSUMPTION THAT PowER WILL BE
EXERCISED BY THE DONEE IN FAVOR OF A STRANGER.-In the case

of People v. The Metropolitan Trust Company' a testator had
left his residuary estate in trust for his wife during her life, and
upon her death the remainder was to be distributed in accordance with her will. No provision was made in event the power
was not exercised. The issue before the court was whether or
not the remainder which was the subject of the power could be
taxed in the estate of the donor upon the assumption that the

power would be exercised in favor of a stranger. Section twentyfive of the Inheritance Tax Act provides that, where property is
transferred or limited in trust or otherwise upon contingencies or
conditions, the tax on the transfer should be imposed at the highest rate possible under the provisions of the act.2 Subsection four
of Section one of said act, as amended in 1933, provides that,
where a power of appointment is exercised, the tax should be
assessed as though the property belonged to the donee and had
been devised or bequeathed by him. 3 The Illinois Supreme Court
held that sub-section four of Section one is a limitation on Section
twenty-five and that the tax upon a remainder which is the subject of a power of appointment should be assessed at the time of
Sautelle v. Carlisle, 13 Lea (Tenn.) 391 (1884).
729 (1938).
2 "Section 25. When property is transferred or limited in trust or otherwise, and the rights, interests or estates of the transferees or beneficiaries are
dependent upon contingencies or conditions whereby they may be wholly or
in part created, defeated, extended or abridged, a tax shall be imposed upon
said transfer at the highest rate which, on the happening of any of the said
contingencies or conditions, would be possible under the provisions of this
act, and such tax so imposed shall be due and payable forthwith by the
executors or trustees out of the property transferred.
Ill. State Bar
Stats. 1935, Ch. 120, 1 419.
3 Section 1(4). "Whenever any person, institution or corporation shall exercise a power of appointment derived from any disposition of property made
either before or after the passage of this Act, such appointment, when made,
shall be deemed a taxable transfer under the provisions of this Act, in the
same manner as though the property to which such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power and had been bequeathed or
devised by such donee by will." Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935, Ch. 120, ff 396.
25

1 369 Ill. 84, 15 N. E. (2d)

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

the death of the donor upon the assumption that the power will
not be exercised. Prior to 1933, subsection four also provided
for situations in which the power was not exercised. This was
accomplished by making the tax assessable at the time of the
nonexercise as though the property had belonged to the donee
and had been devised or bequeathed by him. 4 Subsection four

as it existed before the 1933 amendment and Section twenty-five
were first construed together in the case of People v. Linn,5 and
the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that where a testator
left property subject to a power of appointment, no tax could be
6
assessed on such property at the time of the death of the donor.
7
The Court, with two judges dissenting, said that the legislative
intention must be determined from a view of the whole statute
and that subsection four was meant to be a limitation on Section
twenty-five. 8 The case of People v. Cavenee9 was decided subsequent to the amendment, but the effect of the amendment with
regard to cases arising thereafter was not before the court,1"
which did, however, agree with the conclusion reached in the
Linn case.
No case involving construction of the amendment to subsection
four had come before our Supreme Court prior to the case under
4 The following portion of sub-section 4 of Section 1 was omitted by the
1933 amendment: "Whenever any person or corporation possessing such a
power of appointment so derived shall omit or fail to exercise the same within
the time provided therefor, in whole or in part, a transfer taxable under the
provisions of this Act shall be deemed to take place to the extent of such
omission or failure, in the same manner as though the persons or corporations thereby becoming entitled to the possession or enjoyment of the property to which such power related had succeeded thereto by a will of the
donee of the power failing to exercise such power, taking effect at the time
of such omission or failure." Ill. State Bar Stats. 1931, Ch. 120, 1 396.
5 357 Ill. 220, 191 N. E. 450 (1934). Testator left property in trust for
his daughter with general power to appoint by will and, in default of appointment, to her issue, with gift over if she should leave no issue.
6 See F. 0. Dicus, "Taxation of Powers of Appointment," 4 CHIcAGOKENT REVIEW 14.
7 The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Orr and joined in by Justice
Farthing, was based on the theory that the two sections -were not inconsistent and that a tax should be assessed in the estate of the donor under
Section 25 and a reassessment made upon a transfer being made by the
donee, either by the exercise or nonexercise of the power, thus letting the
state collect the higher tax at the time of donor's death, yet giving a meaning
to subsection 4.
•8 Citing People v. Donohue, 276 Ill. 88, 114 N. E. 513 (1916) ; Uphoff v.
Industrial Board of Ill., 271 Ill. 312, 111 N. E. 128 (1916) ; and other cases.
9 368 Ill.
391, 14 N. E. (2d) 232 (1938).
10 The donee died after the 1933 amendment, expressly refusing to exercise
a power. Donor had died before the amendment. The question was whCthI:r
the state could impose a tax at the death of the donee upon his failure to
exercise the power, in view of the 1933 amendment, and the Court held that
it could not. Justices Orr and Farthing dissented.
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discussion, but the Inheritance Tax Office since this amendment
of 1933 has computed inheritance taxes in cases involving powers
of appointment by applying the highest rate of tax as provided
in Section twenty-five and assessing the tax at the time of the
death of the donor. 1' It was conceded in the present case that
the tax should be assessed in the estate of the donor, but the state
contended that the tax should be assessed in the estate of the
donor upon the assumption that the power would be exercised
in favor of a stranger, thus making the higher rate of tax
applicable. The court said that subsection four provides for an
entirely different transfer tax to be assessed at the time of the
death of the donee where the power has been exercised and that
to assume it would be exercised is to assume a situation wherein
the state would have no power whatever to assess a tax in the
estate of the donor of the power. The court repeatedly emphasized that Section twenty-five imposed a tax upon the transfer
at the highest rate possible "under the provisions of this act"
four and Section twenty-five had to be conand that subsection
12
strued together.
Justices Farthing and Orr, who dissented in the Linn case,
also dissented in this case. It is significant to note the words
with which the dissenting opinion is closed: "The logical result
of the majority opinion would be to require another transfer tax
in case the power is exercised, but this result is not admitted by
the majority." Apparently, the minority considers the tax which
is assessed at the death of the donor and based upon the assumption of nonexercise of the power to be a final tax upon a present
transfer. It is suggested that such is not the case. A contingency
is something that may or may not happen.' 3 That a power of
appointment will not be exercised is something that may or may
not happen and is a contingency. Prior to the amendment of
subsection four in 1933, the act specifically provided, for the
contingency of nonexercise; however, since 1933 such contingencies are not mentioned in the act, and thus Section twentyfive would apply. This would make a tax due at the death of
the donor upon the contingency of nonexercise. It must be kept
in mind that the tax is one upon the right of succession and is not
11 Inheritance Tax Case No. 27164 (Inheritance Tax Office of Cook
County).
12 Citing People v. Donohue, 276 Ill. 88, 114 N. E. 513 (1916), and other
cases, as authority for the proposition that a statute must be so construed
as to give effect to the whole thereof.
Is Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.).
14 "The tax is not upon the estate of the decedent but upon the right of
succession." In re Estate of Graves, 242 Ill. 212 at 216, 89 N. E. 978 (1909).
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a tax against any estate.1 4 If the power subsequently should be
exercised, there should be a reassessment at the time of such
exercise and the tax computed as though the property to which
the appointment related belonged absolutely to the donee of such
power and had been bequeathed or devised by such donee. 15 This
tax assessed in case of exercise would be entirely different from
the one paid at the death of the donor, and, as the tax which
was paid at the death of the donor under Section twenty-five was
paid upon a transfer which never took place, the parties who
paid the tax at the death of the donee would be entitled to a
refund thereof. 16 It seems that the court could have taken no
other view than it did and still have given a decision consistent
with that given in the Linn case.
The Illinois statute was adopted from the New York provision. 17 Subsection four and Section twenty-five were both
added to the Illinois statute in 1909. The first case' 8 in New
York construing the corresponding sections of the New York
act came to the same conclusion as did the Linn case. Two years
after the former decision, the New York statute corresponding
to subsection four regarding the nonexercise of powers was
declared unconstitutional.' 9 This provision was repealed in
20
1911. It was not until 1922, however, that the New York court
definitely held that the tax should be levied at the time of the
death of the donor and not at the time of the exercise of the
Under subsection 4 of Section 1.
"Section 25. . . . Provided, however, that on the happening of any
contingency whereby the said property, or any part thereof is transferred to
a person, corporation or institution exempt from taxation under the provisions of the inheritance tax laws of this State, or to any person, corporation
or institution taxable at a rate less than the rate imposed and paid, such person, corporation or institution shall be entitled to a (reassessment or redetermination of the tax and to a) return (by the State Treasurer) of so
much of the tax imposed and paid as is the difference between the amount
paid and the amount which said person, corporation or institution should pay
under the inheritance tax laws .... " The transfer by reason of the exercise
would, it seems, be one to a party exempt from the tax insofar as the tax's
being assessed in the donor's estate is concerned. Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935,
Ch. 120, 419.
17 People v. Linn, 357 Ill. 220, 191 N. E. 450 (1934).
18 In re Howe, 83 N. Y. S. 825 (1903), aff'd, 176 N. Y. 570, 68 N. E.
1118 (1903), held that the tax was to be assessed against the estate of the
donee.
19 In re Lansing's Estate, 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905). The power
was exercised in favor of one who would have taken even if the power had
not been exercised at all. The appointee elected not to take under the power
and was permitted to so elect. The court held the provision relating to nonexercise to be unconstitutional, because it predicated a tax upon a transfer
that could never take place. The transfer would be from the donor where
the power was not exercised.
20 In re Cole's Estate, 195 N. Y. S. 541 (1922).
15
16
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power by the donee. The court in the instant case did not rely
for its decision on In re Cole's Estate.; 21 it did, however, interpret
that decision as holding that the tax on the estate of the donor
should be assessed upon the assumption that the power was not
exercised. The decision benefits persons having a life interest in
property subject to a power of appointment. Such persons will
receive the income from the fund which the state would appropriate if permitted to levy the tax at the highest rate under Section
twenty-five at the death of the donor.
B. HARDY
TRUSTS LIABLE

FOR

ACCOUNTING OF TRUSTEE UNAUTHORIZED

WHETHER TRUSTEE IS

ADVANCEMENTS

NECESSARIES FOR LIFE TENANT AND

USED

TO

PROVIDE

INFANT REMAINDERMEN.-

The Illinois Appellate Court in the recent case of Haw v. Haw1
held that the estate of a deceased trustee is not liable to either
the life beneficiary or the infant remaindermen for unauthorized
advancements made to the life beneficiary where the money was
advanced solely upon the representations of the life beneficiary
that it was to be used to purchase necessaries for herself and the
infant remaindermen.
The facts out of which this litigation arose are as follows: In
1912, one Mrs. Haw of Seattle, Washington, received from the
estate of a deceased resident of Chicago, Illinois, certain personal property and real estate situated in that city. Shortly
thereafter, she executed an instrument of trust in which she
conveyed the title to the aforesaid property to one Van Housen
in trust to collect the income and, after deducting all expenses,
to pay the residue to Mrs. Haw in monthly installments during
her lifetime and, upon her death, to divide the trust corpus
equally among her children surviving her. One child was in esse
when the trust was created. The trustee entered upon his duties
immediately and continued to administer the trust until his death
in 1931. During a portion of this time (from 1916 until the
trustee's death), Mrs. Haw sent him a great number of telegrams
requesting money in excess of the income of the property. The
trustee was persuaded to send Mrs. Haw small sums from time
to time by representations contained in the telegrams that some
of the money was to be used by her to purchase food, coal, and
clothing for herself and her children, who were the infant
remaindermen.
21 Supra, n. 20.
1 295 111. App. 488, 15 N. E. (2d) 45 (1938).
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Upon the trustee's death, Mrs. Raw filed a bill for appointnrent
of a successor trustee and for an order upon the trustee's administrators to render an account. The account filed credited the
deceased trustee with the advancements made to Mrs. Haw. Both
Mrs. Haw and the infant remaindermen (through their guardian
ad litem) objected to the accounting. The trial court sustained
their objections and held the trustee's estate liable for the
advancements in excess of income, but it allowed the trustee's
estate credit by way of rental for a residence which was purchased by the trustee ott of trust funds and in which the life
beneficiary, her husband, and their children made their home,
although no such item was claimed in the account fied by the
trustee's administrators. From this decree an appeal was taken.
The appellate court, as already pointed out, decided that the
estate of the deceased trustee was not liable for the unauthorized
deviation from the terms of the trust. to the detriment of the
remaindermen because of "extraordinary facts" which the court
stated it would "examine... to determine whether it will enforce
the rule requiring a trustee to account where it would make
the 'enforcement' of the rule 'questionable.' "
As a result of this decision, a number of interesting questions
present themselves. First, does a court of equity have the power
to grant a trustee permission to deviate from the terms of his
trust; second, assuming that the court has the aforementioned
power, will the court subsequently approve an unauthorized
deviation if it is shown that permission to deviate would have
been given had a proper petition been presented; and third,
assuming that the court will not give later approval to an
unauthorized deviation, to what extent are infant remaindermen
prevented from demanding an accounting because they have
benefited by the breach of trust?
As to the first question, it seems safe to say that a court of
equity will, if an emergency is shown to exist, grant a trustee
permission to deviate from the terms of the trust instrument. To
adopt the language of an early Illinois case,2 "Exigencies often
arise not contemplated by the party creating the trust, and which,
had they been anticipated would undoubtedly have been provided
for, where the aid of the court of chancery must be invoked to
grant relief imperatively required ....

."

But this power will not

be exercised to remake the trust instrument merely to give the
cestuis advantages which are not provided for in the trust instrument, even though the court might do a better job of draftsman2

Curtis v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201 at 230 (1862).
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ship.3 The court, when it does exercise the power to authorize a
deviation, does so on the theory that it is doing what the settlor
would have authorized the trustee to do had he contemplated
the emergency. 4 In the instant case, the settlor had transferred
all of her property to the trustee, reserving to herself only the
income. Is it not reasonable to suppose that, had she contemplated the possibility that the income would prove inadequate,
she would have made some provision for her support out of the
trust res? Moreover, the fact that she ordered the income to be
paid to her in monthly installments indicates to some extent that
she intended to use the money for current domestic needs. It
seems likely that, if the trustee had brought a petition asking
permission to use part of the corpus for the support of the life
tenant and the infant remaindermen, a decree authorizing a
deviation would not have been disturbed on review.
As to the second question, "It seems probable that the court
will approve or ratify the conduct of the trustee in exceeding his
powers, after the ultra vires act has been done, in those cases
where it would have approved the proposed change in trust
terms if the matter had been submitted to it in advance." 5 The
difficulties involved in thus taking a retrospective view are
manifestly great, since the court is called upon to consider the
facts as they existed at the time the emergency presented itself
and decide whether or not it would have authorized the deviation had a petition been presented to the court at that time. This
task is not insurmountable, however, and the cases,' while small
in number, indicate that the courts occasionally exercise this
power, although they do so with caution.
The solution to the third question is anything but satisfactory.
Even though it is assumed that the facts in this case are such
that the court would not give its belated approval to an un3 Johns v. Johns, 172 Ill. 472, 50 N. E. 337 (1898).
4 In Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N. E. 306 (1900), the court held that,
even though a trust instrument was specific as to the length of time for which
a trustee might lease the trust property, the court would authorize the trustee
to execute a lease for a longer period than that fixed by the testator if it
were shown that an emergency was present. For other cases permitting a
deviation or a reading in of an implied power, see Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227,
33 N. E. 858, 20 L. R. A. 247 (1893) ; Cary v. Cary, 309 Il1. 330, 141 N. E.
156 (1923) ; see also 12 CHICAGO-KENT REW 11.
5 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, 561.
6 In Stitzer v. Whittaker, 3 Neb. (unof.) 414, 91 N. W. 713 (1902), the
court said: "It is well settled that he [the trustee] may do that without a
decree or order of court which the court would order or decree him to do on
a showing made." To the same effect, see In re Catanach's Estate, 273 Pa.
368, 117 A. 178 (1922) ; American Trust Co. v. Nicholson, 162 N. C. 257,
78 S. E. 152 (1913).
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authorized deviation, it is well established 7 that the life
tenant would have been estopped to make a claim for damages
arising out of a breach of trust which she herself induced. As
to the infant remaindermen, while the court did not expressly
say that they were estopped, it did say that because of the extraordinary facts it would be "questionable" to apply the rule
requiring an accounting, since it appeared that the infant
remaindermen had been fed and clothed out of the fruits of
the breach.
The case s in which the facts most nearly resembled the present
case involved remaindermen who were sui juris. It does not
follow that, had the parties litigant been infants, the result
would have been the same. Thus it has been held9 that a guardian
of a minor cestui cannot acquiesce in a wrongful investment so
as to bind the minor. Moreover, there are cases 10 holding that, if
the cestui is under the disability of infancy, the mere fact that
he consents to the trustee's unauthorized act will not prevent
him from subsequently holding the trustee liable for the deviation.
Estoppel is seldom, in the absence of fraud, a defense against
a minor."' In this case, however, since the court took the view
that most, if not all, of the money advanced to the life tenant was
used by her to feed and clothe the infant remaindermen, it
would appear that the court did not proceed on the theory that
the minors had in any way estopped themselves, but rather that
the equities of the case were with the estate of the trustee.
Equity has always taken the position that, when to award specific
relief would inflict a hardship on the defendant which is out
of all proportion to the injury its refusal would cause to the
plaintiff, the chancellor may refuse to grant the relief prayed
for.1" Thus, if the appellate court's conclusion as to the facts
7

White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589, 48 N. E. 128 (1897) ; Warner v. Rogers,

255 Ill. App. 78 (1929).
8 In Harsell v. Townsend, 123 N. Y. S. 787 (1910), where the remaindermen were of full age when the unauthorized payments were made to the life
tenant and where they had received their principal support from the life
tenant (who was their mother), it was held that they could not compel the
trustee to account for and again pay over the money so paid to their mother.
9 International Trust Co. v. Preston, 24 Wyo. 163, 156 P. 1128 (1916).
10 Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land and Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 P. 1044
(1928); Clay v. Thomas, 178 Ky. 199, 198 S. W. 762 (1917) ; Ehlen v.
Mayor, etc. of City of Baltimore, 76 Md. 576, 25 A. 917 (1893).
11 Wieland v. Kobick, 110 Ill. 16, 51 Am. Rep. 676 (1884); Lewis v. Van
Cleve, 302 Ill. 413, 134 N. E. 804 (1922); McInness v. Oscar F. Wilson
Printing Co., 258 I1. App. 161 (1930).
12 Madison v. Ducktown, etc. Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S. W. 658 (1904);
Rosser v. Randolph, 7 Port. (Ala.) 238 (1838) ; Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo.
262, 215 P. 534 (1923); see also H. L. McClintock, "Discretion to Deny
Injunction against Trespass and Nuisances," 12 Minn. L. Rev. 565.
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is correct, no issue can be taken with the result arrived at, since
to hold otherwise would be to give undeserved benefits to minors
not equitably entitled to them.
J. P.McGumE
WILLS -

CONSTRUCTION -

TION -ON BEQUEST

MADE IN

EFFECT OF FAILURE OF CONSIDERACONSIDERATION OF SERVICES TO DE
1

RENDERED ESTATE.-In the recent case of In re Trybom's Will,

the New York Court of Appeals was called upon to construe a
lawyer's own will, wherein the testator made the following gift:
"I do hereby give, devise and bequeath to my associate, Dorothy
M. Hannigan, all of my office furniture, and all of my interest in
the library at my office at 51 Chambers Street, New York City,
that being a one-half interest and a one-half interest in all the
pending legal matters in consideration of the services to be rendered in the probate of this my last Will and Testament." The
residue was given to the testator's wife, who was also named
executrix. After the testator's death the associate tendered her
services to the executrix, who refused to accept them. Thereafter
the executrix petitioned the Surrogate to construe the will. The
Surrogate, 2 and later the Appellate Division s held that the gift
was contractual in its nature and that, by reason of the nonperformance of the quid pro quo required by the expression "in
consideration," the gift failed. The Court of Appeals, however,
in a brief, almost cryptic opinion, upheld the gift.
it has often been said that the cardinal rule which binds a
court in construing a will is to ascertain and effectuate the testator's intention. 4 But it has also been said that technical words
will be presumed to have been employed in their technical sense,
particularly when the will is the handiwork of a skilled legal technician.5 The second of these principles is usually subordinated
to the first (as are the other rules of construction) 6 by the qualification "unless a contrary intention clearly appears.'' 7 This
qualification fails to furnish any clear standard by which the
court may determine which principle to apply in a case before it,
but rather, in the final analysis, it rests the matter in the ultimate
1 277 N. Y. 106, 13 N. E. (2d) 596 (1938).
2 In re Trybom's Will, 295 N. Y. S. 123 (1937).
3 In re Trybom's Will, 297 N. Y. S. 436 (1937).
4 69 C. J., § 1118, and numerous cases cited in footnote 28.
5 G. W. Thompson, Construction and Interpretation of Wills (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928). § 77.
6 Page. Wills (2d ed.), I, § 806.

7 Thompson, Construction and Interpretation of Wills. § 77; Page. Wills

(2d ed.). I, § 822.
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judgment of the court. The language of the present opinion
indicates that the court was of such a conviction as to the actual
intention of the testator that it felt justified in disregarding the
strict technical meaning of the phrase "in consideration" even
though these were the words chosen by a lawyer in drafting his
own will, a fact which would seem virtually to dictate their acceptance in their full technical import.
It is interesting to note the features of the will which impelled
the court to reject the technical construction of the words "in
consideration."
First, the court comments on the omission of
words which would in any way bind the executrix to accept the
services of the legatee as attorney. 8 This would tend to indicate
that the testator foresaw the possibility that his executrix might
choose not to employ his associate. Next, the court comments
that a gift over is lacking, from which the inference may be
drawn that the testator had no intention to make any other disposition in the event that his executrix did decline the services.
The opinion also suggests that the court considered the disparity
in value between the gift on the one hand, and the services to
be rendered in the probate of a simple will on the other, and
apparently regarded this as tending to negative the idea that
the one was intended to be the quid pro quo for the other.
Finally the court calls attention to the obvious advantage to the
estate of having the pending law practice would up by one
presumably familiar therewith and in whom the testator reposed
confidence. This, it concludes, was the primary and dominant
purpose of the gift.
Having thus freed itself of the limitation imposed by the
strict construction of the words "in consideration,' '9 the court
proceeded to uphold the gift by treating such conditional import
as remained in the language as merely incidental and satisfied by
the tender and refusal of performance. That this manner of
treatment logically effectuates the intention of the testator as
8 Had the testator expressly directed his executrix to employ the associate
as attorney, such direction would not have been binding on the executrix.
In re Ogier's Estate, 101 Cal. 381, 35 P. 900 (1894) ; In re Caldwell, 188
N. Y. 115, 80 N. E. 663 (1907); In re Wallach, 150 N. Y. S. 302 (1914),
affd. 215 N. Y. 622, 109 N. E. 1094 (1915)
In re Thistlethwaite, 104
N. Y. S. 264 (1907) ; In re Pickett's Will, 49 Ore. 127, 89 P. 377 (1907) ;
Young v. Alexander, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 108 (1885) ; 41 Harvard L. Rev. 709.
9 In re Wallach, 150 N. Y. S. 302 (1914); In re Thistlethwaite, 104
N. Y. S. 264 (1907); Hughes v. Hiscox, 181 N. Y. S. 395 (1920); In re
Brigg's Will, 57 N. Y. S. 390 (1899). In each of these cases, the court found
that the gift was intended to be compensation for the services to be rendered
and held that, upon refusal to accept such services by one vested with discretion to accept them or not, the gift failed by reason of the nonperformance
of the services.
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conceived by the court cannot be denied. It would seem that the
court might well have reached the same result by dealing with
the nonperformance as a condition subsequent having no effect
because of impossibility of performance.
The law favors the vesting of estates, 10 and courts are prone
to construe conditions as subsequent rather than precedent. 1'
The rejection by the court of the quid pro quo sense of the
testator's language eliminates the most formidable obstacle to
dealing with the present language as creating a condition subsequent-namely, that where the performance required by the
condition is intended by the testator to be a consideration for
the gift, the condition will be treated as precedent.12 Where, as
in the present case, the words import a present gift,13 and the
condition requires future performance over a period of time,1 4
and there is no gift over, the condition will be regarded as subsequent.15
The courts are reluctant to divest vested estates and have
resorted to various equitable doctrines to avoid forfeitures for
noncompliance with conditions subsequent. It has even been said
that there will be no forfeiture for breach of a condition subsequent unless the breach is wilful or shows an intention to abandon the gift.18 This is a sweeping statement, but there are several
cases where noncompliance with the condition subsequent has
been excused upon refusal of the beneficiary to accept the performance offered by the legatee. 17 The present case would fall
within this principle if it ean be said that the executrix was the
beneficiary. Since the position of an attorney in probating an
estate is that of an employee of the personal representative, for
10 69 C.J., § 1681.

11 Cronin v. Cronin, 314 Il. 345, 145 N. E. 619 (1924) ; Petition of Norris,
46 R. I. 57, 125 A. 84 (1924) ; Power v. Power, 296 Ill. 611, 130 N. E. 313
(1921) ; Brannon v. Mercer, 138 Tenn. 415, 198 S. W. 253 (1917).
12 In re Welstead, 25 Beav. 612, 53 Eng. Rep. 770 (1858) ; Acherley v.
Vernon, Willes 153, 125 Eng. Rep. 1106 (1739) ; Maguire v. City of Macomb,
293 Ill. 441, 127 N. E. 682 (1920).
'3 Finlay v. King's Lessee, 3 Pet. (28 U. S.) 346, 7 L. Ed. 701 (1830)
Brannon v. Mercer, 138 Tenn. 415, 198 S. W. 253 (1917).
14 Finlay v. King's Lessee, 3 Pet. (28 U. S.) 346, 7 L. Ed. 701 (1830);
Dunne v. Minsor, 312 Ill. 333, 143 N. E. 842 (1924) ; Brannon v. Mercer,
138 Tenn. 415, 198 S. W. 253 (1917).
15 Finlay v. King's Lessee, 3 Pet. (28 U. S.) 346, 7 L. Ed. 701 (1830);
Schrader v.. Schrader, 158 Iowa 85, 139 N. W. 160 (1912).
16 Burrows v. Madison Park and Pleasure Drive Association, 177 Wis.
639, 189 N. W. 535 (1922).
'7 Jennings v. Jennings, 27 Ill. 518 (1862) ; Chicago v. Chicago & W. Ind.
R. R. Co., 105 Ill. 73 (1882) ; Bryant's Adm'r v. Dungan, 92 Ky. 627, 18
S. W. 636, 36 Am. St. Rep. 618 (1892) ; Page v. Frazer's Executors, 14 Bush
(77 Ky.) 205 (1878).
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payment of whom the personal representative is personally'primarily liable,18 it would seem that the executrix was the beneficiary of the services called for by the condition subsequent and
that her refusal would excuse the noncompliance with the terms
of the condition.
G. STEPHENSON
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-CAUSES

OF INJURY-RIGHT

OF

INJURED PERSON TO COMPENSATION WHERE HE HAS NOT BEEN
A PARTICIPANT IN THE HORSEPLAY THAT RESULTED IN His INJURY-In the recent Michigan case of Jones v. Campbell, Wyant

& Cannon Fnndry Company,1 the injured party was engaged
in driving a truck. A fellow employee caught hold of him, and
to support himself he seized the reverse operating lever causing
the truck to move backward until it struck a wall and caused the
injuries complained of. The Supreme Court of the state of
Michigan refused compensation on the grounds that the injuries did not arise out of employment.
It has been generally held in this country, 2 in Canada, 3 and in
18 Parker v. Day, 155 N. Y. 383, 49 N. E. 1046 (1898) ; Austin v. Munro,
47 N. Y. 360 (1872) ; Sprinkle v. Forrester, 162 11. App. 45 (1911);
McAuley v. O'Connor, 92 Ill. App. 592 (1901); Barker v. Kunkel, 10 Il.
App. 407 (1881).
1 284 Mich. 358, 279 N. W. 860 (1938).
2 In Fishering v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 690, 158 P. 215 (1916), an
employee's eye was injured by a trick camera in the hands of another
employee. In the case of In re Moore, 225 Mass. 258, 114 N. E. 204 (1916),
an elevator operator left his post and, while scuffling with another employee
riding on the elevator, injured his foot. In Feda v. Cudahy Packing Co., 102
Neb. 110, 166 N. W. 190 (1917), an employee was injured while scuffling
with fellow employees on an elevator. In Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. L.
161, 95 A. 1007 (1915), a workman was injured by slipping while dodging a
playful blow by a fellow workman. In Laurino v. Donovan, 170 N. Y. S. 340
(1918), an employee was injured by a fellow employee who was experimenting with a percussion cap which he had found. In Tarpper v. Weston-Mott
Co., 200 Mich. 275, 166 N. W. 857, L. R. A. 1918E 507 (1917), an employee
was blown up by a compressed air hose applied by a fellow employee.
Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, 162 Wis. 341, 156 N. W. 143, L. R. A.
1916D 968 (1916) and Ballard's Adm'x v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 128 Ky.
826, 110 S. W. 296 (1908), are also compressed air cases. In Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Bankes, 127 Ohio St. 517, 189 N. E. 437 (1934), the
injured workman instigated play which resulted in his being jabbed in the
eye by the finger of a fellow employee. See also De Filippis v. Falkenberg,
155 N. Y. S. 761 (1915), aff'd, 219 N. Y. 581, 114 N. E. 1064 (1916);
Derhammer v. Detroit News, 229 Mich. 658, 202 N. W. 958 (1925) ; Kirby v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., 187 Ala. 443, 65 So. 358 (1914) ; Arthur B. Honnold,
American and English Workmen's Compensation Laws (Kansas City, Missouri: Vernon Law Book Co.. 1917), 1, 440, § 121; 8 Wis. L. Rev. 229;
46 Harv. 1.. Rev. 166.
'3 Doyle v. Moirs, Ltd.. 48 N. S. 473 (Nova Scotia, 1915). Boy's eye was
destroyed by a pair of shears over which two boys were scuffling.
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England 4 that injuries are not compensable when they arise out
of horseplay. In denying compensation for such an injury, the
courts assign as a reason that the act which caused the injury
constitutes no part of the duties of the frolicsome workman and
consequently no part of the enterprise conducted by the employer. Therefore, it is held that the injury does not arise out
of the employment. 5
There has been, however, a gradual transition in the other
direction. Thus we find that, where the nature of the employment is such that skylarking grows out of the environment, compensation is allowed. In the Illinois case of Pekin Cooperage
Company v. Idustrial Commission,6 men were engaged to place
staves in racks. When one man did not have enough staves to
fill his rack it became the practice for him to steal from another.
A dispute arose in the course of this practice, and injury resulted.
Compensation was permitted on the theory that there was a
causal relation between the employment and the injury. Similarly in an English case 7 where a youthful employee of a coal
mine playfully struck a fellow employee with a chunk of coal,
it was held that the accident grew out of the employment. The
circumstances of the employment were considered such as to
expose him to special risk of stones being thrown by other boys
engaged in the same work of picking foreign matter out of coal.
Some states, while denying compensation generally, have excepted cases where the injured person was not a participant in
the horseplay. 8 Other states holding that the injured person is
4 Armitage v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co., [1902] 2 K. B. 178;
Wilson v. Laing, [1909] Sess. Cas. 1230, 46 Scot. L. R. 843, 2 B. W. C. C.
118; Berryman's Elliott on Workmen's Compensation (9th ed., London:
Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 1926), 102, where the author states, "As it is no
part of the sphere of the employment of workmen to indulge in 'larking' or
'fooling,' an accident which occurs through doing so does not arise out of the
employment, even though the sufferer was not participating in it."
5 In re Loper, 64 Ind. App. 571, 116 N. E. 324 (1917).

6 285 Ill. 31, 120 N. E. 530 (1918). See also Socha v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 105 Neb. 691, 181 N. W. 706 (1921).
7 Clayton v. Hardwick Colliery Co., Ltd., [1916] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 33,
12 N. C. C. A. 792n., rev'g [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 343, 11 N. C. C. A.
237n.
8 Cassell v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 115 Tex. 371, 283 S. W. 127, 46
A. L. R. 1137 (1926); Hollenbach v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W.
152, 13 A. L. R. 524 (1918), where a fellow employee attached an electric
wire to the wash basin; Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills Co., 229 N. Y.
470, 128 N. E. 711, 13 A. L. R. 522 (1920), where the employee was struck in
the eye by an apple thrown by a fellow employee; Willis v. State Industrial
Commission, 78 Okla. 216, 190 P. 92 (1920) ; Newport Hydrocarbon Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 167 Wis. 630, 167 N. W. 749 (1918), where fellow
employees attached an electric wire to a conduit which the deceased seized;
Industrial Commission v. Weigandt. 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N. E. 38 (1921),
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not entitled to compensation9 have held it to be immaterial
whether or not he was a participant. One court has allowed
recovery, even prior to the passage of the compensation act,
where the injury occurred in the course of horseplay which was
made possible by the employer's negligence in permitting the
implement which caused the death to lie readily available.' 0
There is also a line of cases allowing compensation where the
employer fostered the play that resulted in the injury" or where
2
the employer had knowledge of the larking and condoned it.'
14
3
The Indiana case of In re Loper is considered to be the first
case to recognize an exception to the rule that the employer is exempt when the injury arises out of horseplay. Knowledge of such
play by the employer makes the practice an element of the conditions under which the employee is required to work. Where the
employer permits such conditions the danger of injury becomes
where the injured employee was punching a time clock when he was struck
with a file which flew from its handle during a friendly scuffle between two
other employees; Marland Refining Co. v. Colbaugh, 110 Okla. 238, 238 P.
831 (1925) ; Kokomo Steel & Wire Co. v. Irick, 80 Ind. App. 610, 141 N. E.
796 (1923) ; Badger Furniture Co. v. Champeau, 195 Wis. 134, 217 N. W. 734
(1928), where the employee, while waiting for work to commence, was hit
by a nail playfully thrown by another employee; Gilmore v. Ring Const.
Co., 227 Mo. App. 1217, 61 S. W. (2d) 764 (1933).
9 Coronado Beach Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 682, 158 P. 212, L. R. A.
1916F 1164 (1916) ; Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co., 200 Mich. 275, 166 N. W.
857, L. R. A. 1918E 507 (1917), another compressed air case; Pierce v.
Boyer-Van Kuran Lumber & Coal Co., 99 Neb. 321, 156 N. W. 509, L. R. A.
1916D 970 (1916) ; Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. L. 162, 95 A. 1007,
L. R. A. 1916C 1203 (1916); Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, 162 Wis.
341, 156 N. W. 143, L. R. A. 1916D 968 (1916) ; Lee's Case, 240 Mass. 473,
134 N. E. 268 (1922).
10 Robinson v. Melville Mfg. Co., 165 N. C. 495, 81 S. E. 681, 52 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 385 (1914). Here a compressed air hose was permitted to lie about
the floor of the factory without warning to employees against using it, and
in sport a boy was shot with the air and died.
11 In Conklin v. Kansas City Public Serv. Co., 226 Mo. 309, 41 S. W. (2d)
608 (1931), an employee was hit by a batted ball during a ball game
me was held during lunch hour.
sponsored by the employer. The
12 Stuart v. Kansas City, 102 glan. 307, 171 P. 913 (1918) ; White v.
Kansas City Stockyards Co., 104 Kan. 90, 177 P. 522 (1919) ; Johnson Sash
& Door Co. v. District Court, 140 Minn. 75, 167 N. W. 283 (1918) ; Standard
Accident Ins. Co. v. Stanaland, 285 S. W. 878 (Tex. Civ. App., 1926),
where the foreman of the construction crew knew that employees were constantly shooting about the camp for amusement, and the claimant, who was
shot, had not taken part therein. In Blaine v. Huttig Sash & Door Co.,
105 S. W. (2d) 946 (Mo. App., 1937), the claimant was tickled by a fellow
employee. Jumping involuntarily, he was injured. The employer knew of
the tickling proclivities of the instigator. Therefore court held that the
danger of injury became an incident of the employment.
13 64 Ind. App. 571, 116 N. E. 324 (1917).
14 27 Yale L. J. 143. However, see Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial
Board of Ill., 277 Ill. 53, 115 N. E. 122 (1925), which was decided four
months before.
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an incident of the employment. Oddly enough, the state of Michigan, the instant case notwithstanding, seems to hold likewise. "
Also a few apparently extreme cases are to be found which
hold that even though the injured party participated in the play
compensation should be allowed . 6 Thus we have the court of
Washington 1 stating that the basic principle of the Workmen's
Compensation Act is that "industries called in the act extrahazardous should be made to bear the financial losses sustained by
the workmen engaged therein . . . regardless of the manner in

which the injury was received." Although the various state
statutes, with the exception of the state of Ohio,' 8 generally
provide that the injury must grow out of and arise in the course
of employ~ment, the courts are not uniform in their decisions as
to what acts arise out of the employment. Thus in the recent
Federal court case of Penn Sand & Gravel Company v. Norton,19
the deceased, standing on a boat, was helping to unload it. A
fellow employee seized hold of him and threatened to push him
into the river. In the scuffling that ensued, both fell overboard
and were drowned. The court, in allowing compensation, stated
that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment
because it had become the duty of the deceased to resist being
pushed into the water.
The courts of Illinois apparently stand on middle'ground. The
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913 was based largely on the
English act. In 1914, the court, in the case of Knopp v. American
Car and Foundry Copany,"showed tfat it was ready to adopt

a liberal view as to injuries resulting from horseplay. In this
action, which arose under the Employers' Liability Act of 1912,
a statute preceding the Workmen's Compensation Act, a fellow
employee playfully placed a can on the machine of the injured
15 Glenn v. Reynolds Spring Co., 225 Mich. 693, 196 N. W. 617 (1924).
Here a live wire was attached to a wheelbarrow handle. Held, compensation
should be allowed because the employer had knowledge of such pranks.
16 Ashland Iron & Mining Co. v. McDaniel's Dependents, 202 Ky. 19, 258
S. W. 943 (1924); Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57
Utah 589, 196 P. 853 (1921). In Stark v. State Industrial Acc. Commission, 103 Ore. 80, 204 P. 151 (1922), the deceased was the one who originated
the horseplay that resulted in his death. Before he died, he stated, "It was as
much my fault as his [the party who applied the air hose]; we were
scuffling."
17 State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101 (1911).
Is Throckmorton's Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin's 1936 Certified Revision),
1111465-68, which provides that injury must arise "in the course of employment." The courts of Ohio, however, apply the usual test of causal connection.
19 95 F. (2d) 498 (1938), affirming 18 F. Supp. 537 (1938).
20 186 Il1. App. 605 (1914).
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party. When the latter attempted to knock it off, he had his hanJ
crushed. The court held that had the injured man found the can
in the same position, he would have attempted to remove it in
similar fashion. Hence the injury complained of did arise out
of his employment. Where the employer condoned the play that
resulted in the injury, a later Illinois Court permitted an award
to be made. Thus, in the case of Pekin Cooperage Company v.
IndustrialBoard of Illinoid2 1 the employee was standing in line to
receive his pay check. In the jostling that followed, he was
pushed out of the line and injured. The evidence in this case
showed that pushing under these conditions had been customary
and that this fact was known by the employer. This decision, like
that of In re Loper, is one of the pioneer American cases permitting an award in skylarking eases where the employer had
knowledge of mischievous conduct of his employees. In the
case of Payne v. Industrial Commission,22 however, the Illinois
court took a turn towards the conservative. Here the deceased
had been playing with his fellow employees. Just as he turned
to his work the injury complained of was inflicted. The court
denied compensation on the theory that the injury did not arise
out of employment.
The future trend of similar cases in Illinois and elsewhere will
depend largely upon the attitude toward the basic theory underlying workmen's compensation. Supporting the theory that the
act should be liberally construed, we find the statement of the
late Justice Cardozo 23 that the employee's "presence in a factory
...involved exposure to the risk of injury from the careless acts
of those about him ....

Whatever men and boys will do, when

gathered together in such surroundings, at all events if it is
something reasonably to be expected, was one of the perils of
his service." It has similarly been stated: "It may seem harsh
aid- arbitrary to impose liability upon a master for an assault
committed by a workman upon a coworkman, but the purpose
and intent of the statute is to fix an arbitrary liability in the
greater public interest involved. Liability was imposed regardless of fault-vitally different from that under the common
law.' '24 Judge Brogden indicates the attitude of the North Caro-

.21 277 Ill.
53, 115 N. E. 128 (1917).
22 295 Il.388, 129 N. E. 122 (1925).
23 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711
(1920).
24 Verschleiser v. Joseph Stern Son, Inc., 229 N. Y. 192, 128 N. E. 126
(1920). See also Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S.418, 44 S.Ct.
153, 68 L. Ed. 366, 30 A. L. R. 532 (1923), where the court said, "Workmen's compensation legislation rests upon the idea of status, not upon that of
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lina Supreme Court in the following picturesque language: "Indeed, if a workman be denied compensation on the ground that
he was injured by the 'sportive act' of a fellow workman, it
would seem to be clear that the old 'fellow servant' doctrine is
appearing in a brand-new suit of legal clothes and parading
through the law under the brand-new name of 'horseplay.' "25
On the other hand, we find the court of Wisconsin stating: "This
court has endeavored to give to the Workmen's Compensation
Act a broad and enlightened construction, to the end that it may
accomplish to the fullest extent its beneficent purpose. It is to
be remembered, however, that this purpose was to compensate
for injuries resulting from one class of accidents only, namely,
industrial accidents. There is liability only 'where, at the time

of the accident, the employee is performing service growing out
of and incidental to his employment.' "26 From the foregoing
it appears that the trend is away from the instant case.
G. KLOEK
implied contract; that is, upon the conception that the injured workman is
entitled to compensation for an injury sustained in the service of an industry
to whose operations he contributes his work as the owner contributes his
capital-the one for the sake of the wages and the other for the sake of
the profits. The liability is based, not upon any act or omission of the
employer, but upon the existence of the relationship which the employee bears
to the employment because of and in the course of which he has been injured."
25 Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N. C. 28, 153 S. E. 594 (1930). See also
note, 9 N. C. L. Rev. 105.
26 -Federal Rubber M1g. Co. v. .av.ic, 162 Wis. 341, 156 N. W. 143,
L. R. A. 1916D 968 (1916).

